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Abstract 
 
 A case for the benefits of functional-cognitive cross-talk is presented, concerning 
the relationship between confidence in memory and the associated accuracy. While 
cognitive theorists have long accepted that confidence and accuracy are typically related, 
a behavioral explanation was only recently advanced. We argue that had this connection 
been made earlier, then the applied domain of eyewitness identification research may 
have earlier reconsidered, the now largely debunked, but once strongly and long-held, 
idea that an eyewitness’s confidence is at best weakly related to the accuracy of their 
identification.  
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A case for functional-cognitive cross-talk  
All applied psychology aims to change behavior. Yet, the approach of 
behaviorism has been considered obsolete and cast aside by many cognitive 
psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists (Roediger, 2004). De Houwer, Hughes, and 
Barnes-Holmes (2017) provide a corrective to this approach, arguing, “…applied 
psychology can be fortified by strengthening its functional core” (p. 
[TYPESETTER: insert page number from target article here]). We agree that the near 
century long behavioral tradition still has a lot to offer. Indeed, many current cognitive 
scientists do make use of these principles. The functional-cognitive framework proposed 
by De Houwer et al. will promote more of this type of cross talk in the future.  
The main contribution of this comment will be to substantiate the authors’ claims 
that applied psychology will benefit from being remapped onto “…a common set of 
general functional principles…” (p. [TYPESETTER: insert page number from target 
article here]; De Houwer et al., 2017). We focus on a case in which behavioral principles 
were used to explain confidence in memory judgments in the basic cognitive literature, 
and we argue that those principles would also have been helpful in evaluating related 
claims in the applied domain. It is important to note from the start that the use of 
confidence ratings as a proxy for memory strength may seem at odds with a functional 
approach. This usage could run the risk of confounds identified by De Houwer et al. 
(2017) in the sense that it would be unfruitful to assume a one-to-one relationship 
between confidence ratings and memory strength. However, the fact that there is not a 
direct mapping does not in itself render the measure invalid as long as researchers 
acknowledge this fact. Indeed it is generally well understood that confidence ratings can 
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be influenced by many factors (e.g., sex), much in the same way as the key pecking of 
pigeons and the lever presses of rats. The important point for all of these measures is the 
way in which they are interpreted and more of a functional-cognitive cross-talk can help 
refine interpretations. For the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the level of 
confidence can be informative about the strength of a memory without assuming a one-
to-one relationship.  
In a series of list learning memory experiments, Mickes, Hwe, Wais, and Wixted 
(2011) asked participants to rate their confidence that items presented in a retrieval phase 
had been presented during the previous study phase. They found that confidence and 
accuracy were strongly related. That is, responses made with low confidence were low in 
accuracy and responses made with high confidence were high in accuracy. This was not 
news. This relationship has been found to be strong in countless memory experiments. 
What was new, however, was that participants could not further calibrate their confidence 
to reflect the accuracy of very strong memories. Mickes et al. drew from behavioral 
principles to explain this puzzling result: 
The key consideration for purposes of understanding why participants are 
apparently unable to scale their strongest memories is that the learning 
process that may account for a participant’s general ability to scale memory 
strength involves differential error feedback. Such training may be 
necessary for people to make effective use of their own internal sense of 
memory strength. In this regard, Skinner (1953) once made the following 
argument: “Strangely enough, it is the community which teaches the 
individual to ‘know himself’” (p. 261). More specifically, Skinner argued 
that certain aspects of mental life remain undifferentiated in the absence of 
explicit discrimination training. To make this point, he used the example of 
color: “Anyone who as suddenly been required to make fine color 
discriminations will usually agree that he now ‘sees’ colors which he had 
not previously ‘seen’ ” (p. 260). It is conceivable that it is the same way 
with the subjective sense of memory strength. Through discrimination 
training involving differential error feedback, people come to be able to 
accurately gauge to the strength of their own memories such that the 
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relationship between confidence and accuracy becomes quite strong...  (p. 
256)  
 
Using these principles, Mickes et al. argued that memories recalled with the highest 
levels of strength are unlikely to generate error feedback (because they are highly likely 
to be correct). For this reason, there is not the opportunity to learn to discriminate 
between the strongest memories and therefore people cannot report confidence at a finer 
grain scale.   
This is an example of the type of cross talk between cognitive and functional 
levels that is advocated by De Houwer et al. (2017). Namely, they write, “First, when a 
specific phenomenon or intervention can be linked with a more general functional 
principle, it allows one to utilize not only the functional knowledge about that general 
principle but also the cognitive models that have been developed to account for other 
instances of that general principle or the general principle itself” (p. 
[TYPESETTER: insert page number from target article here]). In this example, the 
specific phenomenon to be explained is confidence in a memory judgment (a cognitive 
effect). This phenomenon is linked with the more general principle of error feedback in 
discrimination training (a behavioral/functional principle), such that the existing 
functional knowledge about the way in which feedback from the environment shapes our 
behavior can be applied to understand decision making in memory.  
 Although Mickes et al. (2011) originally invoked the functional explanation to 
explain the puzzling results at the highest levels of confidence, it can also be applied to 
the broader spectrum of confidence-accuracy results in general. More specifically, if the 
process of learning to calibrate confidence proceeds through repeated pairings of a 
particular memory strength to a certain level of error feedback from the environment, 
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then this predicts a clear confidence-accuracy relationship. However, in early eyewitness 
identification research it was believed that there was at best a weak confidence-accuracy 
relationship (e.g., Krug, 2007; Penrod & Cutler, 1995; Wells & Murray, 1984). This 
belief has had serious consequences in the criminal justice system to the extent that, for 
example, juries are now often warned to discount confidence of an eyewitness altogether 
(e.g., New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charges, 2012). Yet over time, it has become 
increasingly clear that under adequate testing conditions, this relationship is much 
stronger than once believed (e.g., Brewer, Keast, & Rishworth, 2002; Brewer & Wells, 
2006; Palmer, Brewer, Weber, & Nagesh, 2013; Sauerland, Sagna, & Sporer, 2012; 
Wixted, Mickes, Clark, Gronlund & Roediger, 2015; Wixted, Mickes, Dunn, Clark, & 
Wells, 2016). This outcome could arguably have been predicted from an earlier move to 
a functional approach.  
This example could be seen as applying the cognitively-inspired analytic-
abstractive (CIAA) approach defined by De Houwer et al. (2017) and supports their 
claim that CIAA research can bridge functional and cognitive approaches to drive useful 
new developments. However, in the interests of balance it is important to acknowledge 
that many cognitive researchers are already steeped in functional ideas and naturally 
make reference to them throughout their work. For example, a recent taxonomy of 
attentional control draws heavily on principles of associative learning to explain the 
influences of past experience on attentional allocation (e.g., Awh, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2012). In this sense, the purported divide between functional and cognitive 
approaches that is described by De Houwer et al. seems somewhat overstated. 
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Nevertheless, we do agree that the formalization of the approach that is provided by the 
functional-cognitive framework is likely to increase this type of cross-talk.  
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